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Federally-funded international aid and development con-
tracting is a multibillion-dollar industry suffering from fraud,
corruption, and systemic mismanagement.' The United States
relies heavily upon local employees and third-country nationals
to implement its contracting objectives overseas. 2 In the case of
the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), local and third-country nationals outnumber United
States citizen contractor employees roughly 100 to 1.3 Although
the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA)4 extends
criminal liability to all contractors whose employment supports
the mission of the Department of Defense overseas, no compara-
ble statute exists for civilian agency contractors.5 As a result,
employees of contractors supporting agencies such as the State
t BA 2006, Carleton College; JD Candidate 2013, The University of Chicago Law
School.
1 See, for example, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling costs, Reducing risks, Final Report to
Congress, 5 (Aug 2011), online at http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWCFinal
Report-lowres.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("Final Report").
2 Id at 20 (citations omitted).
3 Id.
4 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), Pub L No 106-523, 114 Stat
2488 (2000), codified at 18 USC §§ 3261-67.
5 See Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2011, Hearing on S 1145 before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Executive Business Meeting, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (June 23,
2011) (statement of Senator Leahy), online at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/
testimony.cfm?id=3d9031b47812de2592c3baeba601239f&witid=3d9031b47812de2592c3
baeba601239f-0-1 (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("Leahy Statement"). Although versions of the
Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act were introduced in the House and Senate in
both 2010 and 2011, all were either tabled or are awaiting committee action.
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Department and USAID fall into a jurisdictional gap. 6 It is un-
certain whether the United States has the authority to prosecute
the non-US citizen employees of civilian agency contractors for
fraud, corruption, and other criminal conduct abroad.7
Recently, federal prosecutors have begun to apply domestic
criminal statutes to noncitizen contractor employees to combat
corruption in overseas government contracting.8 One such stat-
ute is the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute.9 In July of 2011, the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia heard a case involving an
Australian contracts manager indicted under this statute after
offering to steer $14 million in business to an Afghani construc-
tion company in exchange for a $190,000 cash bribe.10 Among
other things, the district court considered the issue of what due
process standard should apply to noncitizens prosecuted for crim-
inal acts committed entirely outside of the United States and its
territories. 1
Six circuit courts have considered this issue and are split in-
to two camps. The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits have held
that the Due Process Clause requires a "sufficient nexus" be-
tween the defendant and the United States before a noncitizen
can be haled into federal courts for acts committed abroad. 12
6 Id. See also Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, At
What Risk? Correcting Over-Reliance on Contractors in Contingency Operations, 52-53
(Feb 24, 2011), online at http: //www.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWCInterimReport2-1
owres.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("Second Interim Report").
7 See Final Report at 30 (cited in note 1) (noting that "jurisdiction over contractors is
ambiguous, legal accountability is uncertain, and a clear command-and-control structure
is absent"). See also id at 157-59.
8 For a list of recent convictions for corruption in Iraq following investigation by the
Office of the Special Investigator General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), see Commis-
sion on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hearing on Implementing Im-
provements to Defense Wartime Contracting, 9, Appendix (Apr 25, 2011) (statement of
Stuart W. Boden Jr, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction),
online at http: //www.wartimecontracting.govdocsfhearing2011-04-25_testimony-Bowen
.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("SIGIR Hearing"). See also, United States v Carson, 2011 WL
5101701, *7-8 (CD Cal) (finding that whether foreign corporations should be considered
an "instrumentality" of a state under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) is a fac-
tual question; finding further that since the FCPA applies only to the bribery of foreign
officials, instrumentalities, and government entities, expanding this to include state-
sponsored corporations or corporations with significant state investment would allow the
United States to prosecute commercial bribery under the FCPA); United States v Ayesh,
762 F Supp 2d 832, 841-42 (ED Va 2011) (finding that the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction was proper in the instance of a Jordanian resident and United States Embas-
sy-Baghdad employee indicted for embezzlement).
9 See 18 USC § 666.
10 See United States v Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d 293, 297 (DDC 2011).
11 Id at 306-08.
12 US Const Amend V. See United States v Yousef, 327 F3d 56, 111 (2d Cir 2003);
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Conversely, the First, Third, and Fifth Circuits find that the Due
Process Clause only requires that the prosecution was neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. 13
This Comment argues that this circuit split is illusory be-
cause courts apply the same criteria to determine whether a "suf-
ficient nexus" exists or whether the prosecution is "neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair." Moreover, even if these stand-
ards were meaningfully different, the Supreme Court has found
that the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute does not contain a nexus
requirement between the federal funding and alleged criminal
conduct. 14 In many cases of government contract fraud overseas,
the only link between the defendant and the United States is the
federal money funding the contract or grant.15 Applying a "suffi-
cient nexus" standard to extraterritorial applications of the Fed-
eral Anti-Bribery Statute is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's decision that no such nexus is necessary.16 Therefore, due
process only requires that the prosecution be "neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair."17
The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute remains troubling from a
due process standpoint because this statute is both broadly writ-
ten and broadly interpreted by United States federal courts.18
United States v Mohammad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx 259, 261 (4th Cir 2009) (per curiam);
United States v Davis, 905 F2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir 1990).
13 See United States v Cardales, 168 F3d 548, 552-53 (1st Cir 1999); United States v
Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F2d 1052, 1056 (3d Cir 1993); United States v Suerte, 291 F3d 366,
375 (5th Cir 2002).
14 See Sabri v United States, 541 US 600, 604 (2004).
15 See Final Report at 81-85 (cited in note 1) (discussing the problem of unde-
finatized task orders and systemic shortfalls in project management and oversight in Iraq
and Afghanistan). Also consider United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), Fiscal Year 2011 Agency Financial Report, 5 (Nov 15, 2011), online at http://
transition.usaid.gov/performance/afr/afrl.pdf?lI1811 (visited Sept 10, 2012) ("2011
USAID AFR") (discussing USAID's strategies and methods for collaborating with NGO
sector groups to achieve the United States' strategic goals). Compare these methods of
distribution and collaboration to United States v Hines, 541 F3d 833, 837 (8th Cir 2008)
(finding that a police officer with no direct connection to a federal grant could still be held
liable under § 666 for accepting bribes or gratuities in exchange for timely performance of
official duties). If courts were to apply the Hines standard internationally, a staff member
of a host-country NGO who accepted gifts or bribes could be haled into court in the United
States if his employer received United States federal funds.
16 See Sabri, 541 US at 604.
17 See id.
1s See 18 USC § 666. Consider Hines, 541 F3d at 836-37 (finding that gratuities paid
to a police officer in exchange for timely performance of official duties qualified as a bribe
under § 666 because these transactions were worth more than $5,000 to the persons pay-
ing these bribes). See also United States v Kranovich, 401 F3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir 2005)
(finding that an agency did not actually have to receive the minimum federal funding
prescribed by the statute, but merely have this money available to it at will); United
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The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute is so expansive that it could
implicate low-level employees of foreign subcontracting compa-
nies engaging in business practices that are legal in the local ju-
risdiction.19 To prevent this kind of overreach, courts considering
international bribery cases involving the employees of federal
civilian aid contractors should use a minimum contacts analysis
similar to that outlined in World- Wide Volkswagen Corporation v
Woodson 20 to determine that the prosecution is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair.21 Incorporating a minimum contacts
analysis will satisfy the United States' interest that its contract-
ing dollars are not misspent, while at the same time ensuring
that it will only assert jurisdiction over defendants who should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the United
States.
Part I of this Comment reviews the current challenges in
combating corruption in federal contracting abroad, especially for
contracts administered through civilian agencies. Part I also de-
scribes the extent of government contracting fraud and the De-
partment of Justice's recent use of the Federal Anti-Bribery
Statute in United States v Campbell22 to hold a foreign national
accountable for bribery and solicitation.
Part II examines the circuit split over which due process
standard should apply to noncitizens prosecuted under United
States criminal law for acts committed entirely outside of the
United States and its territories. Part II concludes that this cir-
cuit split is illusory because courts on both sides of the split use
nearly identical criteria to determine whether a prosecution sat-
isfies the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
States v Sotomayor-Vazquez, 249 F3d 1, 10 (1st Cir 2001) (noting that courts typically
grant § 666 wide scope and apply the statute equally to low-level employees and to those
with discretionary power).
19 See 18 USC § 666(d)(1) (defining "agent" for purposes of the statute to include "a
servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative" of the
qualifying agency). See also United States v Ollison, 555 F3d 152, 160 (5th Cir 2009)
(finding that "[t]he statute itself does not distinguish between 'high-level' and 'low-level'
employees"). In light of this expansive construction, consider Final Report at 79 (cited in
note 1) (noting that "key subcontractors came from cultures in which bribes and kick-
backs are common"). This issue is not unique to subcontracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
and it extends to economic development and disaster relief initiatives as well. See 2011
USAID AFR at 123-26 (cited in note 15) (discussing "widespread corruption" that hin-
dered efforts to deliver program goals in Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Haiti in Fiscal
Year 2010).
20 444 US 286 (1980).
21 Id at 291.
22 798 F Supp 2d 293 (DDC 2011).
432 [ 2012
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Part III argues that even if this circuit split is not illusory, it
does not apply to the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute because the
Supreme Court has held that the statute does not require a nex-
us between the federal funding provided to the agency or organi-
zation and the bribe solicited or received.23 As such, requiring a
nexus between the defendant and the United States through fed-
erally-funded contracting monies would compensate for a flaw in
the statute, which the Supreme Court has found does not exist.
Although the circuit split is either illusory or inapplicable in
this context, Part IV argues that courts should adopt a minimum
contacts standard to determine whether an extraterritorial pros-
ecution under § 666 is consistent with due process. Applying a
minimum contacts test would ensure that a defendant has suffi-
cient contacts with the United States to reasonably anticipate
being haled into federal court, while still allowing prosecutors to
use § 666 to combat corruption in overseas government contract-
ing.
I. FEDERAL CONTRACTING ABROAD: FRAUD, JURISDICTIONAL
GAPS, AND PROSECUTORIAL CREATIVITY
A. Fraud in Government Contracts Abroad: A Brief Overview
International aid and development contracting is a multibil-
lion-dollar industry suffering from endemic corruption, fraud,
and mismanagement. 24 Recently, the Commission on Wartime
Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan found that at least $31 bil-
lion-and possibly as much as $60 billion-in contracting funds
had been lost to waste and fraud in Iraq and Afghanistan be-
tween 2002 and the end of 2011.25 The Commission reported
that, at the mid-range of its estimates, the United States has lost
$12 million per day to contract waste and fraud for the past ten
years. 26
The United States relies heavily upon contractor personnel
to carry out essential security and rebuilding functions in Iraq
and Afghanistan.27 Many of these contractors are not United
23 See Sabri, 541 US at 604.
24 See generally Final Report (cited in note 1); Second Interim Report (cited in note
6).
25 Final Report at 5 (cited in note 1). Note that this report used fiscal years, not cal-
endar years.
26 Id at 32, 68.
27 Id at 20.
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States citizens. 28 In 2010, the Department of Defense, the State
Department, and USAID employed over 260,000 contractor-
employees.29 Most of these contractor-employees are local and
third-country nationals: of the approximately 260,000 contrac-
tors employed in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2010, only about
46,000 were United States nationals.30
Although over 80 percent of contractors employed in Iraq
and Afghanistan work for the Department of Defense, the State
Department and USAID together employed over 55,000 contrac-
tors as of March 31, 2010.31 Nearly 49,000 of these civilian agen-
cy contractors were either local or third-country nationals. 32 The
number of contractors and grantee employees supporting the
State Department and USAID projects in Afghanistan exceeds
the number of agency employees by a ratio of 18:1 for the State
Department and 100:1 for USAID. 33 These ratios indicate that
the State Department and USAID rely heavily upon contractors
to execute, rather than support, their missions in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan.34 At the same time, this skew in favor of non-US na-
tionals raises questions regarding whether the State Department
and USAID have the capacity to effectively monitor and evaluate
noncitizen employees and the programs they carry out.3 5
B. Jurisdictional Gaps Exacerbate Fraud in Government Con-
tracts Abroad Because the United States is Unable to Effec-
tively Prosecute Noncitizens for Acts Committed Outside the
United States and its Territories
In addition to a general lack of oversight, there is no clear
way to assert personal jurisdiction over many employees of Unit-
ed States civilian agency contractors.36 For military contractors,
the MEJA extends criminal liability to any person, regardless of
citizenship, who "engages in conduct outside the United States
that would constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for
more than 1 year if the conduct had been engaged in within the
28 See id.




33 Final Report at 20 (cited in note 1).
34 See id at 21.
35 See id.
36 See id at 157-59 (cited in note 1); Leahy Statement, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in
note 5); Second Interim Report at 52-53 (cited in note 6).
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special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States"
if that person is "employed by or accompanying the Armed Forc-
es outside the United States."37 Although MEJA originally did
not apply to civilians working for United States agencies other
than the Department of Defense, Congress amended MEJA in
2004 to include contractors of "any other Federal agency, or any
provisional authority, to the extent such employment relates to
supporting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas."38
Despite this seemingly broad grant of jurisdiction, the Unit-
ed States remains unable to effectively prosecute civilian con-
tractors under federal criminal law.39 Despite the extensive in-
volvement of contractor employees in the Abu Ghraib scandal
and dozens of sexual assault claims filed against the employees
of contractors such as Kellogg, Brown & Root, the Department of
Justice prosecuted a total of twelve cases under MEJA between
2000 and 2008.40 Many scholars argue that the small number of
cases brought under MEJA shows that the statute has been a
failure. 41
3 18 USC § 3261(a).
38 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub L
No 108-375, 118 Stat 1811, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(II). See also
Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions of Private
Military Firms, 324 Conn J Intl L 239, 253-54 (2009) (discussing the possible implica-
tions of expanding MEJA after the 2004 amendments, but noting that "it remains to be
seen how this [amendment] will be interpreted"); Alan F. Williams, The Case for Overseas
Article III Courts: The Blackwater Effect and Criminal Accountability in the Age of Privat-
ization, 44 U Mich J L Reform 45, 47-49 (2010) (discussing uncertainties surrounding the
extension of United States criminal jurisdiction to State Department contractor employ-
ees despite the 2004 amendments to MEJA).
3 See Leahy Statement, 112th Cong, 1st Sess (cited in note 5) ("Currently, criminal
jurisdiction over atrocious crimes like that committed abroad is complicated and depends
too greatly on the specific location of the crime which makes prosecutions inconsistent
and sometimes impossible. We must fix the law to help ensure that victims will not see
the perpetrators escape accountability."). See also Final Report at 158-59 (cited in note
1).
40 Williams, 44 U Mich J L Reform at 62 (cited in note 38), citing Closing Legal Loop-
holes: Prosecuting Sexual Assaults and Other Violent Crimes Committed Overseas by
American Civilians in a Combat Environment: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on In-
ternational Operations & Organizations, Democracy & Human Rights of the Special
Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong, 2d Sess 42 (2008) (statement of Sigal P.
Mandelker, Deputy Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice) ("Clos-
ing Legal Loopholes"). See also Closing Legal Loopholes, 110th Cong, 2d Sess at 1-3
(statement of Senator Bill Nelson, Chairman, Subcommittee on International Operations
& Organizations, Democracy & Human Rights) (discussing the involvement of contractor-
employees in publicized human rights violations and sexual assault cases).
41 See, for example, Williams, 44 U Mich J L Reform at 65 (cited in note 38)
("[U]nless the civilian population serving in Iraq and other overseas locations are sub-
stantially more law-abiding than members of the [general civilian] population, MEJA has
been a failure."); Geoffrey S. Corn, Bringing Discipline to the Civilianization of the Battle-
field: A Proposal for a More Legitimate Approach to Resurrecting Military-Criminal Ju-
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Although the efficacy of MEJA remains controversial, there
is no comparable statute extending criminal liability to civilian
agency contractors whose employment does not "relate[ I to sup-
porting the mission of the Department of Defense overseas."42 In
response to a recent push for increased oversight and investiga-
tion of fraud in government contracts, 43 federal investigators
have begun to reinterpret existing federal statutes to apply to
government contractors engaged in questionable conduct
abroad.44 Setting aside the controversy over whether it is appro-
priate to enforce domestic criminal statutes extraterritorially, 45
risdiction over Civilian Augmentees, 62 U Miami L Rev 491, 513 (2008) (noting that
"[s]ince enactment, MEJA has not been particularly effective"); William C. Peters, On
Law, Wars, and Mercenaries: The Case for Courts-Martial Jurisdiction over Civilian
Contractor Misconduct in Iraq, 2006 BYU L Rev 367, 385 (2006) ("[TJhe tens of thousands
of contractors who have served or are currently serving in the Iraqi campaign have either
scrupulously avoided any meaningful misconduct, or government efforts to address those
crimes are either lacking or simply ineffective in practice.").
42 18 USC § 3267(1)(A)(ii)(II). See also Second Interim Report at 52-53 (cited in note
6).
43 See, for example, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 ("2008
Authorization Act") § 1229, Pub L No 110-181, 122 Stat 3, 378-85 (establishing the Office
of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction); 2008 Authorization Act
§ 841, 123 Stat at 1982-33 (establishing the Commission for Wartime Contracting in Iraq
and Afghanistan); Executive Order No 13550, Establishment of Pakistan and Afghani-
stan Support Office, 75 Fed Reg 51615 (Aug 23, 2010).
44 See SIGIR Hearing (cited in note 8). See also Final Report at 91-92 (cited in note
1). This second report noted that the International Contract Corruption Task Force has
opened 876 cases related to wartime contracting; however, of these, only 150 have actual-
ly been charged. It is uncertain how many have been tried and convicted. See generally
note 8.
45 In Morrison v National Australia Bank Ltd, 130 S Ct 2869 (2010), the Supreme
Court reiterated its presumption against the extraterritorial application of a federal stat-
ute absent clear congressional intent. Id at 2877. Specifically, the Court found that "un-
less there is the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to give a statute
extraterritorial effect, we must presume it is primarily concerned with domestic condi-
tions." Id (quotation marks omitted). For this reason, "[w]hen a statute gives no clear
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none." Id at 2878. The seemingly une-
quivocal language in Morrison would suggest that 18 USC § 666, passed in 1984 to com-
bat domestic corruption, is not properly applied extraterritorially. Despite the Court's
recent pronouncement in Morrison, the district court in Campbell found an earlier Su-
preme Court case, Bowman v United States, 260 US 94 (1922), controlling. See Campbell,
798 F Supp 2d at 304-05. The district court reasoned that since the Supreme Court has
not overruled Bowman and since § 666 "falls precisely in line with the limited type of
criminal statutes addressed in Bowman"--that is, statutes enacted because of the Gov-
ernment's right to defend itself against obstruction or fraud wherever perpetrated, and
therefore not dependent upon their locality for the Government's jurisdiction-the Feder-
al Anti-Bribery Statute "falls squarely within Bowman's holding." Id at 304. Whether the
district court properly concluded that the government's right to defend itself against
fraud constitutes a "clear indication of extraterritorial application" is debatable, and
could form the basis for another Comment or Article entirely. See generally Zachary D.
Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of US Criminal Law After Mor-
rison v. National Australia Bank, 67 NYU Ann Surv Am L 137 (2011).
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prosecuting foreign nationals under United States criminal law
for acts committed abroad presents troubling due process con-
cerns. Specifically, extraterritorial prosecution presents the
question of how and under what circumstances federal criminal
laws may be applied to comport with the Due Process Clause.
C. Campbell's Soup: Applying the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute
to Combat Corruption Overseas
In 2011, the District Court for the District of Columbia ap-
plied the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute to prosecute an Australi-
an national who allegedly attempted to solicit a bribe from a
USAID subcontractor in Afghanistan.46 United States v Camp-
bell4 7 addressed the indictment of Neil Campbell, an Australian
contracts manager serving on a panel that selected subcontrac-
tors for various USAID-sponsored rebuilding projects in Afghani-
stan.48 Campbell was indicted under the Federal Anti-Bribery
Act after allegedly attempting to solicit a $190,000 cash bribe
from a federal agent posing as the representative of an Afghani
construction company.49 The indictment charged that Campbell
promised to provide the Afghani construction company with more
than $14 million in USAID-funded subcontracts in exchange for
the bribe.50
The district court found that prosecuting Campbell extrater-
ritorially did not violate his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment.5' In its analysis, the court analyzed a twenty-year-
old circuit split regarding whether the test for due process in ex-
traterritorial prosecutions under United States criminal law re-
quires a "sufficient nexus" with the United States-a standard
that the court defined as "commonly understood as real effects or
consequences accruing in this country"-or whether due process
requires the lesser standard that the prosecution be neither arbi-
trary nor fundamentally unfair. 52 Ultimately, the Campbell court
declined to weigh in on which test more appropriately protects
the due process rights of foreign nationals prosecuted under
United States criminal law for acts committed entirely abroad.
46 See Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d 293.
47 Id.
48 Id at 297-98.
49 Id at 297.
5o Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 297.
51 Id at 308.
52 Id at 306-07.
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The court found instead that the specific facts of this case satis-
fied the Due Process Clause under either standard.53
The district court considered each element of Campbell's in-
dictment, holding that Campbell should have reasonably antici-
pated being haled into court in the United States. 54 The court
identified four factors behind this finding. First, Campbell was
an agent of a federally-funded organization in a position to de-
termine project awards of USAID money to rebuild Afghani-
stan.5 Second, Campbell used this position to attempt to bribe a
potential award recipient with over $14 million of future busi-
ness in exchange for $190,000 in cash.5 6 Third, Campbell spoke
frankly that he risked prosecution and incarceration because of
the transaction, and "clearly understood the link between the
contracts and United States financing."57 Finally, Campbell's
actions directly affected the United States' interests in Afghani-
stan and defrauded American taxpayers.58
Taking the facts alleged in the indictment to be true, the dis-
trict court found that Campbell's "actions directly implicated
American interests in preserving the integrity of its vast sums of
donated monies to be free from corruption, bribery and fraud."5 9
Further, in addition to "hold[ing] the United States up to oppro-
brium in Afghanistan, every instance of such connivance robs
USAID money from its intended purpose, hinders the United
States's substantial efforts in Afghanistan, and also robs USAID
of support for its effort from the U.S. taxpayer."6 o Based on these
findings, the court concluded that Campbell had abused his posi-
tion to knowingly and intentionally defraud the United States for
the purpose of personal enrichment, hindering American inter-
ests in rebuilding Afghanistan.61 As such, the court found no vio-
lation of Campbell's due process rights under either the "suffi-
cient nexus" or the "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair"
standard.62
53 Id at 307.




58 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 307-08.
59 Id at 307.
60 Id at 307-08.
61 Id at 308.
62 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 307-08.
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT DISCUSSING THE APPROPRIATE DUE
PROCESS STANDARD FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL PROSECUTION IS
ILLUSORY BECAUSE COURTS USE THE SAME CRITERIA UNDER
EITHER STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PROSECUTION IS
CONSISTENT WITH DUE PROCESS
As the district court noted in Campbell, circuit courts cur-
rently disagree as to whether the Due Process Clause requires a
"sufficient nexus" between the defendant and the United States
or whether the looser "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair" standard is sufficient. 63 Despite the existence of a twenty-
year-old circuit split, it is unclear whether the "sufficient nexus"
and "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" standards pro-
duce different results. For that reason, this Comment argues
that the circuit split is illusory because the two standards re-
quire courts to consider the same criteria to determine whether
an extraterritorial prosecution satisfies the Due Process Clause.
A. The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits Find That a "Suffi-
cient Nexus" Must Exist Between a Defendant and the Unit-
ed States in Extraterritorial Prosecutions to Ensure Due
Process of Law
The Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits find that the extra-
territorial prosecution of foreign nationals under United States
criminal law requires the existence of a sufficient nexus between
the defendant and the United States to satisfy the Due Process
Clause. In United States v Davis,64 the Ninth Circuit held that
applying a federal criminal statute extraterritorially requires the
existence of a sufficient nexus with the United States to ensure
that the application of United States law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. 65 In a later case, United States v Klima-
vicius-Viloria,66 the Ninth Circuit clarified its decision of what
constitutes a "sufficient nexus," holding that "[t]here is a suffi-
cient nexus where an attempted transaction is aimed at causing
criminal acts within the United States. Specifically, there is a
sufficient nexus where the plan for shipping the drugs was likely
to have effects in the United States."67 This suggests that the
63 Id at 306-07.
64 905 F2d 245 (9th Cir 1990).
65 Id at 248-49 (citations omitted).
66 144 F3d 1249 (9th Cir 1998).
67 Id at 1257 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Ninth Circuit's formulation of "sufficient nexus" requires that the
criminal activity must have a likely-but not actual or demon-
strated-effect in the United States. The language of Klima-
vicius-Viloria implies that a sufficient nexus exists when a de-
fendant's plan would likely have caused harm to the United
States, whether or not it actually did so.
The Second and Fourth Circuits adopted the Ninth Circuit's
sufficient nexus standard and applied it in novel contexts. For
example, in United States v Yousef,68 the Second Circuit used the
sufficient nexus standard to allow a terrorism prosecution to pro-
ceed despite the fact that it did not involve the Maritime Drug
Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA), 69 the law underlying the prose-
cutions in both Davis and Klimavicius-Viloria.70 Unlike the drug
smugglers in both Davis and Klimavicius-Viloria, the defendants
in Yousef conspired to attack US-flag aircraft carrying United
States citizens in an effort to harm them and influence United
States foreign policy.7 1 Although the criminal acts in Yousef took
place in the Philippines, the Second Circuit found that a suffi-
cient nexus existed because the defendants "conspired to attack a
dozen United States-flag aircraft in an effort to inflict injury on
this country and its people and influence American foreign poli-
cy."72 As such, it "cannot be argued seriously that defendants'
conduct was so unrelated to American interests as to render
their prosecution in the United States arbitrary or fundamental-
ly unfair."73 In Yousef, the Second Circuit found that the Due
Process Clause allowed the United States to assert jurisdiction
over foreign nationals conducting criminal acts outside of the
United States and its territories because the defendants intend-
ed to affect the United States and its interests abroad. 74 This is
similar to the standard employed in Campbell, where the district
court found that the defendant's actions satisfied both the suffi-
cient nexus and "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" due
68 327 F3d 56 (2d Cir 2003).
69 46 USC § 70501 et seq.
70 Compare Davis, 905 F2d at 247 (discussing the defendant appealing his conviction
for violations of the MDLEA) and Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1256 (stating that the
convictions on appeal stem from violations of the MDLEA), with Yousef, 327 F3d at 82-85
(discussing the counts of the indictments of various defendants in Yousef).
71 Yousef, 327 F3d at 111-12.
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process standards because they compromised American interests
in Afghanistan.75
Like the Second Circuit, the Fourth Circuit applied the suffi-
cient nexus test to nonmaritime criminal conduct. In United
States v Mohammad-Omar,7 6 the Fourth Circuit applied the suf-
ficient nexus standard from Davis to prosecute a Yemeni citizen
for his participation in an international drug trafficking ring.77
Mohammad-Omar was charged for participating in a sophisticat-
ed drug trafficking scheme to transport heroin from Afghanistan
to Ghana and Dubai for eventual distribution in the United
States.78 Although he committed no crime within the United
States, the Fourth Circuit found that the actions underlying Mo-
hammad-Omar's multiple convictions for conspiracy satisfied the
nexus requirement because Mohammad-Omar's business partner
knew that the heroin they sold was destined for the United
States and imputed that knowledge to Mohammad-Omar.7 9 Be-
cause Mohammad-Omar knew the full details and scope of his
business partner's transactions, he "had ample reason to antici-
pate being haled into court in the United States."80 As the Ninth
Circuit had reasoned in Klimavicius-Viloria, the Fourth Circuit
likened the sufficient nexus test to the minimum contacts test
required to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant within
the United States.81 The Fourth Circuit noted that "[t]he nexus
requirement serves the same purpose as the minimum contacts
test in personal jurisdiction. It ensures that a United States
court will assert jurisdiction only over a defendant who should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in this country."82
This definition of "sufficient nexus" implies a subjective stand-
ard. That is, a sufficient nexus exists when the defendant knew
or should have known that his conduct could affect the United
States, its interests, or its citizens.
7 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 307-08.
76 323 Fed Appx 259 (4th Cir 2009) (per curiam).
n Id at 261.
7 Id at 260. For more specific information on the events underlying this case, see
generally, Brief of the United States, United States v Mohammad-Omar, No 08-4596 (4th
Cir filed Oct 10, 2008) (available on Westlaw at 2008 WL 4734904).
7 Mohammad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx at 262.
80 Id.
81 Id at 261.
82 Id, quoting Kilmavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257.
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B. The First, Third, and Fifth Circuits Hold That Due Process
Requires Only That the Prosecution Is "Neither Arbitrary
Nor Fundamentally Unfair"
In contrast to the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the
First, Third, and Fifth Circuits have held that the Due Process
Clause does not require a nexus between the defendant and the
United States in extraterritorial prosecutions. 83 These three cir-
cuits find that the Due Process Clause requires only that the rel-
evant criminal statute is not applied in a way that is "arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair."84
Although the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Circuit's con-
clusion in Davis that due process requires a sufficient nexus be-
tween the defendant and the United States, it appears to confine
its analysis to cases brought under the MDLEA. In United States
v Martinez-Hidalgo,85 the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's conclusion in Davis, holding, "[w]e decline to follow Davis
as we see nothing fundamentally unfair in applying [the
MDLEA] exactly as Congress intended-extraterritorially with-
out regard for a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the
United States."86 The Third Circuit found nothing unfair in Con-
gress's decision to "provide for the punishment of persons appre-
hended with narcotics on the high seas" because narcotics traf-
ficking is "condemned universally by law-abiding nations."87 As
such, the Third Circuit held that no nexus is required for
MDLEA prosecutions because the Piracies and Felonies Clause
grants Congress the power to define and punish felonies commit-
ted upon the high seas and offenses against the law of nations.88
Like the Third Circuit, the First Circuit found that "due pro-
cess does not require the government to prove a nexus between a
defendant's criminal conduct and the United States" in an
MDLEA prosecution if the flag nation of the captured vessel con-
sented to the application of United States criminal law to the
83 Compare Yousef, 327 F3d at 56, Mohammad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx at 259, and
Davis, 905 F2d at 245, with United States v Cardales, 168 F3d 548 (1st Cir 1999), United
States v Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F2d 1052 (3d Cir 1993), and United States v Suerte, 291
F3d 366 (5th Cir 2002).
84 Cardales, 168 F3d at 375; Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F2d at 1056; Suerte, 291 F3d at
375.
8 993 F2d 1052 (3d Cir 1993).
86 Id at 1056.
87 Id.
8 Id. The Piracies and Felonies Clause is found at US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10.
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vessel and its passengers and crew.8 9 Unlike the Third Circuit,
though, the First Circuit grounded its reasoning in principles of
international law. Specifically, the "territorial principle" of inter-
national law permits a state to board a vessel and apply United
States criminal law to those aboard if the flag state authorizes it
to do so.90 Similarly, under the "protective principle," a nation is
permitted to assert jurisdiction over a person whose conduct out-
side the nation's territory threatens that nation's security.91 Tak-
en together, the Third Circuit reasoned that the territorial and
protective principles allow the United States to assert jurisdic-
tion over persons aboard a foreign vessel suspected of drug traf-
ficking if the flag nation consents to the application of United
States law.92 Although the protective principle may allow the
United States to assert jurisdiction where its security is threat-
ened, securing the flag nation's consent eliminates "any concern"
that application of United States law may be arbitrary or fun-
damentally unfair under both the Due Process Clause and cus-
tomary principles of international law.9 3
The Fifth Circuit also found that the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the MDLEA to non-US nationals does not require a nexus
with the United States. In United States v Suerte,94 the Fifth
Circuit held "that, for the MDLEA issue at hand, and to the ex-
tent that the Due Process Clause may constrain the MDLEA's
extraterritorial reach, that clause does not impose a nexus re-
quirement, in that Congress has acted pursuant to the Piracies
and Felonies Clause of the Constitution."9 5
The Suerte court grounded its reasoning in the history of the
Piracies and Felonies Clause of the Constitution, which grants
Congress the power to "define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the High Seas, and Offenses against the Law of
89 Cardales, 168 F3d at 553.
90 Id (citations omitted).
91 Id.
92 Id. In Cardales, the United States Coast Guard boarded and searched the ship
after receiving express authorization from the government of Venezuela. Id at 552. Under
the MDLEA, a vessel becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the United States if the flag
nation either consents or waives objection to the enforcement of United States law by the
United States. Id, citing 46 USC § 70502(c)(1)(C). This consent "may be obtained by radio,
telephone, or similar oral or electronic means, and is conclusively proved by certification
of the Secretary of State or the Secretary's designee." 46 USC § 70502(c)(2)(A).
9 Cardales, 168 F3d at 553.
94 291 F3d 366 (5th Cir 2002).
95 Id at 375.
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Nations." 96 Because the same Congress that passed the Piracies
and Felonies Clause also passed the Fifth Amendment, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the Due Process Clause does not impose a
nexus requirement where Congress has acted pursuant to the
Piracies and Felonies Clause of the Constitution.97
C. The Distinction Between "Sufficient Nexus" and "Neither
Arbitrary Nor Fundamentally Unfair" Is Illusory Because
Courts on Both Sides of the Split Consider the Same Factors
in Determining Whether a Case Satisfies the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Campbell court's decision not to weigh in on the appro-
priate due process standard for government contractor employees
prosecuted under the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute highlights a
timely and unsettled issue of law. Despite the existence of a long-
standing circuit split, it is unclear how the "sufficient nexus" and
"neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" standards differ in
application.
In Campbell, the district court found that courts requiring a
sufficient nexus "look for real effects or consequences accruing in
the United States" to determine whether a nexus exists.98 In a
similar case, United States v Brehm,99 the Eastern District of
Virginia noted that courts imposing a nexus requirement typical-
ly look to four factors to identify whether a nexus exists between
the defendant's conduct and the United States.100 The Brehm
court observed that courts generally consider a wide range of fac-
tors including: (1) the defendant's actual contacts with the Unit-
ed States, including his citizenship or residency; (2) the location
of the acts allegedly giving rise to the alleged offense; (3) the in-
tended effect a defendant's conduct has on or within the United
States; and (4) the impact on significant United States inter-
ests.101 Although the circuit courts differ in their reasoning be-
hind imposing a nexus requirement and definitions of what a
nexus entails, the four factors identified in Brehm provide a gen-
eral overview of how courts on both sides of the circuit split ana-
96 US Const Art I, § 8, cl 10. See also Suerte, 291 F3d at 372-76.
97 Suerte, 291 F3d at 375.
98 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 306.
9 2011 WL 1226088 (ED Va).
too Id at *4.
101 Id.
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lyze whether an extraterritorial prosecution satisfies the Due
Process Clause.
The Ninth Circuit, which generally requires the existence of
a sufficient nexus in MDLEA prosecutions, likened the sufficient
nexus standard to the minimum contacts test for personal juris-
diction established in World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson.102
Specifically, "[t]he nexus requirement serves the same purpose
as the 'minimum contacts' test in personal jurisdiction. It en-
sures that a United States court will assert jurisdiction over a
defendant who 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court' in this country."103 The Fourth Circuit quoted this same
analogy in Mohammad-Omar, finding that sufficient contacts
existed where an international narcotics trafficker knew or
should have known that his drugs would ultimately arrive in the
United States.104
Although the Fourth and Ninth Circuits generally rely upon
a subjective 'minimum contacts' analogy, other opinions in these
same circuits adopt an objective approach by looking to princi-
ples of international law to determine whether a nexus exists
between the defendant's conduct and the United States. In Unit-
ed States v Caicedo,05 the Ninth Circuit declined to extend Da-
vis's nexus requirement to include stateless vessels. 106 Like its
later decision in Klimavicius-Viloria, the Ninth Circuit empha-
sized in Caicedo the importance of the defendant's legitimate
expectations of being haled into court in the United States.10
However, the Caicedo court based its decision not to impose a
nexus requirement to MDLEA defendants aboard stateless ves-
sels upon principles of state sovereignty and international law. 108
In Caicedo, the Ninth Circuit distinguished its reasoning from its
102 Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at
297.
13 Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257.
104 323 Fed Appx at 261-62.
105 47 F3d 370 (9th Cir 1995).
106 Id at 372 ("We decline the defendant's invitation to extend Davis and its progeny to
a stateless vessel on the high seas.").
107 Id at 373. The court reasoned as follows:
The defendants do not point to any jurisdiction where the conduct they are al-
leged to have been engaged in was legal, nor are we aware of any... . These de-
fendants should therefore have been on notice that the United States or any
other nation concerned with drug trafficking could subject their vessel to its ju-
risdiction.
Id (citations and quotation marks omitted).
1os Id at 372-73.
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earlier decision in Davis, noting that a nexus requirement
"makes sense" when corresponding international law would also
require the existence of such a nexus:
A defendant would have a legitimate expectation that be-
cause he has subjected himself to the laws of one nation,
other nations will not be entitled to exercise jurisdiction
without some nexus. Punishing crimes committed on a
foreign flag ship is like punishing a crime committed on
foreign soil; it is an intrusion into the sovereign territory
of another nation. As a matter of comity and fairness,
such an intrusion should not be undertaken absent proof
that there is a connection between the criminal conduct
and the United States sufficient to justify the United
States' pursuit of its interests. 109
Here, the Ninth Circuit analyzed the nexus requirement
through the lens of state sovereignty. Where a defendant sub-
jects himself to the laws of one nation, punishing that person
under United States criminal law for a crime committed on for-
eign soil is an intrusion onto that nation's sovereign territory. 110
As such, principles of comity and fairness dictate that nations
not undertake this type of intrusion absent a nexus between the
defendant's criminal conduct and the United States.111 A nexus
exists where "there is a connection between the criminal conduct
and the United States sufficient to justify the United States' pur-
suit of its interests." 112 Under this analysis, the test for a suffi-
cient nexus is not whether the defendant has a reasonable expec-
tation of being haled into court in the United States, but whether
an objective connection exists between the criminal acts and the
United States that is strong enough to justify intruding upon
another nation's sovereign territory.
The Ninth Circuit's decision not to extend the sufficient nex-
us requirement to defendants aboard stateless vessels implies
that the intrusion-upon-state-sovereignty rationale behind the
sufficient nexus requirement may be stronger than the minimum
contacts analysis, which turns upon an analysis of a defendant's
reasonable-but nonetheless subjective xpectations. In
Caicedo, the Ninth Circuit found that, unlike crimes committed
109 Caicedo, 47 F3d at 372.
110 Id at 373.
112 Id at 372.
112 Id.
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on land or aboard a foreign flagship, stateless vessels "do not fall
within the veil of another sovereign's territorial protection" such
that "all nations can treat them as their own territory and sub-
ject them to their laws."1 13 Since no nexus is required for a nation
to prosecute individuals within its own territory (indeed, requir-
ing a nexus in this instance would be redundant), it follows that
no nexus is required to prosecute persons aboard stateless ves-
sels since a nation may treat a stateless vessel as its own. 1 14 Fur-
thermore, when an individual sails aboard a stateless vessel, he
reasonably expects that any nation may treat him as though he
were a local national; as such, he should reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in the United States-or anywhere else,
for that matter.115
In a later decision, the Ninth Circuit clarified its refusal to
extend the nexus requirement to stateless vessels. In United
States v Moreno-Morillo,116 the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he
act of sailing aboard a stateless vessel . . . is tantamount to a
knowing waiver of personal jurisdiction." 17 Persons aboard
stateless vessels should reasonably anticipate being haled into
court in the United States because they have knowingly waived
personal jurisdiction by defying international maritime law.118
For the purposes of the MDLEA, a government may general-
ly establish that a vessel is without nationality by: (1) proving
that the claimed nation denied a vessel's claim of registry; (2)
proving that the master or person in charge failed to make a
claim of nationality or registry when asked to do so; or (3) prov-
ing that the master or person in charge made a claim of registry,
113 Caicedo, 47 F3d at 373 (citations omitted).
114 Id at 272-73. The court reasoned:
A defendant would have a legitimate expectation that because he has subjected
himself to the laws of one nation, other nations will not be entitled to exercise
jurisdiction without some nexus... . But where a defendant attempts to avoid
the law of all nations by travelling on a stateless vessel, he has forfeited these
protections of international law and can be charged with the knowledge that he
has done so.
Id.
115 Id at 373 ("Because stateless vessels do not fall within the veil of another sover-
eign's territorial protection, all nations can treat them as their own territory and subject
them to their laws."). See also United States v Moreno-Morillo, 334 F3d 819, 829 (9th Cir
2003) ("If a vessel is deemed stateless, there is no requirement that the government
demonstrate a nexus between those on board and the United States before exercising
jurisdiction over them.").
1i6 334 F3d 819 (9th Cir 2003).
117 Id at 828 n 7.
18 Id at 828.
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but that the claimed nation did not affirmatively and unequivo-
cally confirm the vessel's nationality.119 The stateless vessels ex-
ception to the sufficient nexus requirement discussed by the
Ninth Circuit in Caicedo and Moreno-Morillo is therefore likely
confined to cases grounded in the MDLEA because even the most
determined investigator cannot establish that a human being in
Afghanistan falls under maritime law as a stateless vessel upon
the high seas.
D. Courts Use the Same Criteria to Determine the Existence of
a Sufficient Nexus and to Determine Whether a Prosecution
is Arbitrary or Fundamentally Unfair
Although the state sovereignty rationale may clarify the
purpose of the sufficient nexus requirement, it does little to dif-
ferentiate the sufficient nexus requirement from the putatively
looser standard that the prosecution be neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. As the Eastern District of Virginia noted,
the difference between the two standards "is less real than ap-
parent; the existence of a nexus is what makes the prosecution
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."120 For this reason,
the circuit split is largely illusory because courts use the same
criteria to determine both the existence of a nexus and the prose-
cution's fundamental fairness.
In Martinez-Hidalgo, the Third Circuit rejected the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Davis that due process required the exist-
ence of a nexus between the defendant's conduct and the United
States in extraterritorial prosecutions brought under the
MDLEA.121 However, the reasoning in Martinez-Hidalgo does not
differ from the Ninth Circuit's later decisions in Caicedo and
Moreno-Morillo. Like Caicedo and Moreno-Morillo, the facts of
Martinez-Hidalgo involved the seizure of a stateless vessel on the
high seas carrying large quantities of illegal drugs. 122 As in the
later Ninth Circuit cases, the Third Circuit reasoned that the
United States has the "authority to treat stateless vessels as if
they were its own," and therefore has jurisdiction to prosecute
drug offenders on stateless vessels upon the high seas as a mat-
us 46 USC § 70502(d)(1)(A)-(C). See also United States v Perlaza, 439 F3d 1149, 1165
(9th Cir 2006).
120 United States v Shahani-Jahromi, 286 F Supp 2d 723, 728 n 9 (ED Va 2003).
121 Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F3d at 1056.
122 Id at 1053-54.
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ter of international law.123 Because both international law and
the Piracies and Felonies Clause grant the United States juris-
diction to apprehend stateless vessels, the Third Circuit found
that it is not "fundamentally unfair" for the United States to
prosecute drug traffickers aboard stateless vessels in the absence
of a nexus with the United States.124 The Third Circuit's conclu-
sion in Martinez-Hidalgo that the Due Process Clause does not
require the existence of a nexus between the United States and
the unlawful acts committed by persons aboard stateless vessels
parallels the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the same issue.125
Although ostensibly differing on the issue of whether the
Due Process Clause requires a nexus between the defendant and
the United States, the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits each
found that a nexus is unnecessary where the host nation con-
sents to the exercise of jurisdiction over its citizens. The courts
also noted an exception in cases where a foreign citizen's actions
threaten a nation's security-the precise instances in which
courts requiring a nexus have found one to exist.126 Although the
Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits each require the existence of
a nexus of contacts with the United States, these courts employ
the same criteria to determine the existence of a nexus that the
First, Second, and Fifth Circuits have used to determine that a
nexus is unnecessary.127 More specifically, courts consider the
123 Id at 1055 (quotation marks omitted).
124 Id at 1056.
125 Compare Martinez-Hidalgo, 993 F3d at 1056 with Caicedo, 47 F3d at 372-73.
126 See, for example, Cardales, 168 F3d at 553 (finding that a host nation may either
consent to the exercise of jurisdiction over its citizens under the "territorial principle" of
international law or assert jurisdiction over a person whose actions threaten its security
under the "protective principle") (citations and quotation marks omitted); Yousef, 327 F3d
at 96-97. The Yousef court noted:
[J]urisdiction over [a terrorism prosecution] is consistent with the "passive per-
sonality principle" of customary international jurisdiction because each of these
counts involved a plot to bomb United States-flag aircraft that would have been
carrying United States citizens and crews and that were destined for cities in
the United States. Moreover, assertion of jurisdiction is appropriate under the
"objective territorial principle" because the purpose of the attack was to influ-
ence United States foreign policy and the defendants intended their actions to
have an effect-in this case, a devastating effect-on and within the United
States. Finally, there is no doubt that jurisdiction is proper under the "protec-
tive principle" because the planned attacks were intended to affect the United
States and to alter its foreign policy.
Id. See also Suerte, 291 F3d at 370-72.
127 See, for example, Davis, 905 F3d at 249 (finding that a nexus existed between the
defendants and the United States because the "attempted transaction [was] aimed at
causing criminal acts within the United States") (citations omitted); Yousef, 327 F3d at
112 (holding that a nexus existed because the defendant's conduct intended to harm
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offender's contacts with the United States; the impact of the al-
leged conduct with the United States, its interests, and its citi-
zens; and whether the host nation consents to the exercise of ju-
risdiction over its citizens to determine both whether a sufficient
nexus exists and whether a prosecution is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. 128 As such, this circuit split is illusory.
Campbell further illustrates this point. In Campbell, the dis-
trict court found that "[w] hether a 'sufficient nexus' or 'arbitrary
or fundamentally unfair' test is used on these facts, Mr. Camp-
bell's prosecution [met] the requirements of the Due Process
Clause."1 29 Specifically, Campbell's decision to abuse his position
by allocating USAID development monies in exchange for a bribe
directly "hinder [ed] the United States's substantial efforts in Af-
ghanistan," and directly "implicated American interests in pre-
serving the integrity of its vast sums of donated monies to be free
from corruption, bribery and fraud."130 In addition, Campbell
"frankly spoke of his risks of prosecution and incarceration, and
. . . clearly understood the link between the contracts and United
States financing."131 Therefore, "Campbell reasonably should
have anticipated being haled into a court in the United
States."132
Here, the court invoked many of the same principles dis-
cussed in earlier circuit court opinions. Like the Ninth Circuit in
Klimavicius-Viloria and the Fourth Circuit in Mohammad-
Omar, the district court invoked the World-Wide Volkswagen
minimum contacts test to determine that the defendant should
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the United
United States-flag aircraft, United States citizens, and influence American foreign poli-
cy); Mohammad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx at 262 (finding that a nexus existed in the form of
sufficient contacts with the United States because Omar knew that the heroin he sold
was destined for the United States and he knew that his business partner had met with
an undercover agent posing as an American heroin distributor).
128 See Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257 (discussing how the nexus requirement
serves the same purpose as the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction); Moham-
mad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx at 261-62 (finding sufficient contacts where a drug trafficker
knew his heroin would ultimately arrive in the United States, harming United States
interests and United States citizens); Yousef, 327 F3d at 97-98 (noting that asserting
jurisdiction was appropriate because the intended conduct meant to affect United States
foreign policy and kill United States citizens); Davis, 905 F3d at 249 (finding that a nexus
existed because the intended transaction meant to cause criminal acts within the United
States); Cardales, 168 F3d at 553 (discussing consent to jurisdiction).
129 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 307.
130 Id at 307-08.
131 Id at 307.
132 Id.
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States.133 In addition to this subjective standard, the district
court's focus on the effect of Campbell's alleged bribery upon the
United States' interests in Afghanistan recalls the First and Se-
cond Circuits' determinations that due process does not bar ex-
traterritorial prosecutions of noncitizens where the defendant's
conduct jeopardizes the nation's security.134 Ultimately, the
Campbell court borrowed from both sides of the circuit split to
conclude that the facts of the indictment were sufficient to satisfy
due process under either the "sufficient nexus" or the "neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" standard.135
The district court's conclusion in Campbell indicates that the
two standards are not meaningfully different because both tests
tend to produce the same results. Moreover, because the two
tests are couched in general terms, they both allow federal courts
to choose from a menu of rationales to determine that nearly any
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction satisfies the Due Process
Clause. While it is a small comfort that only the most egregious
cases of government contracts fraud are investigated at all, much
less brought to trial, 36 the lack of a clear standard for when due
process allows the United States to prosecute a noncitizen for his
conduct abroad presents a concerning jurisprudential gap-
especially as the Department of Justice increases the number
and scope of prosecutions for contracting fraud in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan. 3 7
III. EVEN IF THIS CIRCUIT SPLIT IS NOT ILLUSORY, IT DOES NOT
APPLY TO THE FEDERAL ANTI-BRIBERY STATUTE BECAUSE THE
SUPREME COURT HAS HELD EXPLICITLY THAT § 666 DOES NOT
CONTAIN A NEXUS REQUIREMENT
Imposing a nexus requirement for extraterritorial prosecu-
tions brought under the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute is incon-
sistent with how § 666 is applied within the United States. Since
the only tie between the defendant in an extraterritorial prosecu-
tion for government contracting fraud and the United States is
133 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 306-07, citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 US at
297.
134 See, for example, Cardales, 168 F3d at 553; Yousef, 327 F3d at 112. See also
Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257.
135 Campbell, 798 F Supp 2d at 307.
136 See Final Report at 159, 161-63 (cited in note 1) ("Investigative agencies are often
unable to access information, physical evidence, and witnesses in a timely manner.").
17 See SIGIR Hearing, Appendix (cited in note 8) (discussing and charting recent
criminal convictions and investigations into contracts fraud).
452 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [2012
the federal funding at issue,13 the sufficient nexus test would
effectively require the government to demonstrate the existence
of a nexus between the federal funding and the bribe solicited or
received. The Supreme Court expressly rejected this type of nex-
us requirement in Sabri v United States.139 While evidentiary
constraints will likely limit viable extraterritorial prosecutions
for noncitizens to cases where a clear nexus exists, 140 Sabri fore-
closes the ability of courts to impose this requirement directly.141
Since courts may not impose a sufficient nexus standard, the ap-
propriate due process standard must be that the prosecution was
neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.
A. The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute
Congress enacted the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute'4 2 as part
of Title XI of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984143 to
prevent the loss of federal funds to bribery and theft by officers
and employees of government agencies and organizations receiv-
ing federal funds. 144 In passing § 666, Congress sought to plug a
regulatory gap by extending federal bribery prohibitions to
bribes offered to state and local officials employed by agencies
receiving federal funds. 145
138 See, for example, Final Report at 71-72 (cited in note 1) (discussing host-nation
challenges in dispensing and monitoring waste in development contracting).
139 541 US 600 (2004).
140 See, for example, Final Report at 92 (cited in note 1). The report notes:
The sheer number of contracts for Iraq and Afghanistan points to a high poten-
tial for fraud. However, of the 332 cases that the task force reported as being
closed, the Department of Justice told the Commission that it charged only 150
individuals and companies. Few cases of wartime-contracting fraud are actually
prosecuted. Many of the cases are closed for a variety of reasons including a
lack of evidence, the difficulty of investigating them, and the cost of prosecution.
Id.
141 Sabri, 541 US at 605.
142 18 USC § 666.
143 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1976 (1984).
1 See United States v Westmoreland, 841 F2d 572, 576 (5th Cir 1988).
145 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, S Rep No 225, 98th Cong, 2d Sess
369 (1984) reprinted in 1984 USCCAN 3182, 3510. The Senate Report stated:
In many cases, such prosecution is impossible because title has passed to the
recipient before the property is stolen, or the funds are so commingled that the
Federal character of the funds cannot be shown. This situation gives rise to a
serious gap in the law, since even though title to the monies may have passed,
the Federal Government clearly retains a strong interest in assuring the integ-
rity of such program funds.
Id.
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The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute prohibits the agents of
federally-funded organizations from soliciting, accepting, or giv-
ing bribes connected to that organization's business activities.146
In § 666(a)(2), the statute criminalizes: (1) the corrupt offering or
solicitation of anything of value; (2) to or by the agent of any; (3)
agency or organization which receives at least $10,000 of benefits
under a Federal program; (4) in connection with a transaction or
the business of the organization; (5) involving anything of value
of $5,000 or more. 147
B. The Supreme Court and Subsequent Circuit Court Holdings
Make Clear That § 666 Does Not Contain a Nexus
Requirement
The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute does not require a nexus
between the federal funding received and the agent's illegal con-
duct. In Sabri, the Supreme Court dismissed the argument that
a statute must require proof of a connection between a bribe or
kickback and the federal funding as an element of the offense.148
146 See generally, 18 USC § 666(a)-(b). In relevant part, § 666 provides:
(a) Whoever, if the circumstance described in subsection (b) of this section ex-
ists-
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or Indian tribal gov-
ernment, or any agency thereof-
(A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority
knowingly converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner
or intentionally misapplies, property that-
(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organi-
zation, government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any person, or accepts or
agrees to accept, anything of value from any person, intending to be influ-
enced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series
of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving any-
thing of value of $5,000 or more; or
(2) corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of value to any person,
with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organization or of a State,
local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, in connection with
any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, gov-
ernment, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; shall be
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the or-
ganization, government, or agency receives, in any one year period, benefits in
excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant, contract, subsidy,
loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance.
Id.
147 18 USC § 666(a)(2).
148 541 US at 604.
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After Sabri, circuit courts expanded upon the Supreme
Court's finding that § 666 does not require a nexus between the
federal funding and the bribe solicited or received. In United
States u Guishard,149 the Third Circuit applied Sabri to find that
the government was not required to prove a connection between
a case-specific federal interest and the bribe itself.150 Similarly,
the Eighth Circuit found that Sabri "lessen[ed] the burden of
federal prosecutors to prove what may be an impossible-to-trace,
but very real, impact of local corruption on federal funds."15 1 In
United Sates v Hines,152 the Eighth Circuit concluded that a po-
lice officer could be convicted of violating § 666 or accepting cash
payments from property owners in exchange for performing evic-
tions, even if prosecutors could not demonstrate that these pay-
ments affected federal funds. 153
In the instance of government contracts abroad, the lack of a
nexus requirement is potentially troubling because corruption
and financial mismanagement are endemic in many nations in
which the United States distributes aid monies and engages in
economic development contracts. 154 If applied extraterritorially,
§ 666 could theoretically make every employee of a contracting
company or government agency receiving federal funding who
engages in conduct considered fraudulent in the United States
criminally liable under the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute. How-
ever, although Sabri indicates that adopting a sufficient nexus
standard would be inappropriate in extraterritorial prosecutions
brought under § 666, the fundamental fairness standard can, and
should, incorporate elements from the sufficient nexus test to
preserve the due process rights of noncitizens and comply with
principles of state sovereignty and international law.
149 163 Fed Appx 114 (3d Cir 2006).
150 Id at 118 (finding that in Sabri, "the Supreme Court -recently held there was no
need to prove a connection between a case-specific federal interest-or, more narrowly,
federal funds-and the bribe itself").
151 United States v Hines, 541 F3d 833, 836 (8th Cir 2008).
152 541 F3d 833 (8th Cir 2008).
153 Id at 835-37.
154 See generally 2011 USAID AFR at 133-36 (cited in note 15). See also Final Report
at 146 (cited in note 1) (noting that "[a]udits and investigations oversight requirements in
Afghanistan and Iraq are mission-critical, given the scope, scale, and impact of waste and
corruption in the two theaters and their pernicious effects on the U.S. mission").
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C. Without Some Due Process Limitation, Applying § 666 Ex-
traterritorially Could Criminalize Every Part-Time Employ-
ee of Every Company in Afghanistan
The broad language and expansive judicial interpretation of
the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute indicate that due process re-
quires some connection between the foreign defendant and the
United States to ensure that a prosecution is neither arbitrary
nor fundamentally unfair. Without such a nexus, the inclusive
definitions of "qualifying agency" and "agent" under § 666 could,
in theory, allow absurdly tangential prosecutions.1 5 5 Under some
interpretations, an Afghani taxi driver for an Afghani-owned
subcontractor for an Australian firm receiving USAID contract-
ing funds could face corruption charges in the United States for
accepting gratuities totaling more than $5,000 in a calendar
year. 156
Although the practical constraints associated with extrater-
ritorial prosecution make the subcontractor's taxi driver scenario
unlikely, this hypothetical illustrates the importance of adopting
some kind of minimum contacts standard into courts' evaluation
of whether a prosecution is consistent with due process. The
155 But see Williams, 44 U Mich J L Reform at 65 (cited in note 38); Corn, 62 U Miami
L Rev at 513 (cited in note 41); Peters, 2006 BYU L Rev at 385 (cited in note 41). Despite
MEJA's apparently unlimited grant of jurisdiction over noncitizens working abroad, it is
generally considered to be a failure because of the institutional and structural barriers to
effective investigation and prosecution of government contractors working in conflict
zones. Even in egregious cases such as the Abu Ghraib scandal, few if any government
contractor employees have been indicted-let alone tried and convicted-for their in-
volvement in violent felonies. See, for example, Keith Rothman, Diagnosing and Analyz-
ing Flawed Investigations: Abu Ghraib as a Case Study, 28 Penn St Intl L Rev 1, 13 n 75
(2009) (discussing the lack of any systemic Department of Defense investigation of pri-
vate contractors in prisoner abuse scandals, despite extensive evidence that these con-
tractors played a significant role in running the prison and abusing detainees). As such,
while the indiscriminate application of § 666 could technically implicate a subcontractor's
taxi driver given a loose interpretation of the statute, such scenarios are unlikely.
156 See Hines, 541 F3d at 836-37 (finding that gratuities paid to police officers in
exchange for timely performance of official duties qualified as a bribe under § 666). Be-
cause these transactions were worth more than $5,000 to the persons paying this bribe,
§ 666 applied even where the bribes themselves did not meet the statutory threshold of
$5,000. Id. The issue of whether a bribe or series of bribes must exceed the statutory
threshold of $5,000 is the subject of a circuit split. See also, for example, United States v
Abbey, 560 F3d 513, 521 (6th Cir 2009) (stating in dicta that § 666 contains a "require-
ment that the illegal gift or bribe be worth over $5,000"). Some circuits have found that
the "thing of value" at stake in the bribery transaction could be nonmonetary. See United
States v Marmolejo, 89 F3d 1185, 1191, 1191-92 (5th Cir 1996) (finding that conjugal
visits constituted a thing of value worth more than $5,000); United States v Fernandes,
272 F3d 938, 944 (7th Cir 2001) (finding that § 666 applied to a prosecutor receiving
multiple bribes from multiple people totaling $5,000 in exchange for expunging motorists'
DUI convictions).
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Federal Anti-Bribery Statute is broad, and courts read the terms
"qualifying agency" and "agent" expansively. Under the plain
language of § 666(b), an "agency" is any "organization, govern-
ment, or agency [that] receives, in any one year period, benefits
in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant,
contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of
Federal assistance."15 7 Generally, courts read this statute to in-
clude almost all payments of federal monies-even when those
monies were not actually received.
In Fischer v United States,158 the Supreme Court found that
a hospital that received payments under Medicare received bene-
fits "under a Federal Program" for the purpose of the statute-
even though the patients, not the hospital, benefited from the
federal program.' 9 Fischer clarified that agencies receiving bene-
fits in excess of $10,000 under a federal program do not need to
be the direct beneficiary of that program to qualify as an agency
for the purposes of § 666.160 Carrying this further, in United
States v Kranovich,161 the Ninth Circuit found that the require-
ment that an agency receive benefits of $10,000 under a federal
program was satisfied where amounts in excess of $10,000 were
available to the agency, even where less money was actually re-
ceived.162
Following Kranovich, a government contractor with at-will
access to more than $10,000 in federal funds that does not actu-
ally receive this money could still qualify as an organization sub-
ject to the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute. This is especially trou-
bling for contractors operating in contract zones, where many
transactions are conducted in cash or with minimal formality.163
As in the case of "qualifying agency," courts have usually
read the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute's definition of "agent"
broadly. Under § 666(d)(1), "the term 'agent' means a person au-
167 18 USC § 666(b).
158 529 US 667 (2000).
** Id at 669.
160 Id.
161 401 F3d 1107 (9th Cir 2005).
162 Id at 1112 ("[Tlhere is no reason to distinguish between access to guaranteed grant
funds that are available upon request.").
163 See United States Agency for International Development Office of the Inspector
General, Review of Cash Disbursement Practices of Selected USAID/Afghanistan Imple-
menting Partners, Report No F-306-11-002-S 4 (Mar 7, 2011), online at http://transition
.usaid.gov/oig/public/fy1 1rpts/f-306- 11-002-s.pdf (visited Sept 10, 2012) (finding that
USAID implementing partners in Afghanistan made more than $13.5 million in cash
payments in fiscal year 2010). See also James Glanz, New Fraud Cases Lead to Lapses in
Iraq Projects, NY Times Al (Mar 13, 2010).
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thorized on behalf of another person or a government, and, in the
case of an organization or government, includes a servant or em-
ployee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representa-
tive."16 4 As the language of the statute suggests, courts typically
apply the antibribery provisions of § 666 to both low-level em-
ployees and those with power or control over the organization's
activities and operations.
In United States v Sotomayor-Vazquez,1 65 the First Circuit
noted that § 666 "has been given a wide scope, to include all em-
ployees from the lowest clerk to the highest administrator." 16 6
More recently, the Fifth Circuit found in United States v Olli-
son167 that "[t]he statute itself does not distinguish between 'high
level' and 'low level' employees. When construing § 666 in the
past, we have consistently applied the statute in accordance with
its plain language." 168 Since courts typically apply the Federal
Anti-Bribery Statute to all employees without regard to their
position within a qualifying agency, applying § 666 extraterrito-
rially could subject any member of an international organization
receiving United States foreign aid funding to United States
criminal jurisdiction-even if the employee's conduct was legal or
customary in the country where the transaction took place.169
IV. COURTS APPLYING THE FEDERAL ANTI-BRIBERY STATUTE TO
COMBAT CORRUPTION IN OVERSEAS GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING
SHOULD APPLY A MINIMUM CONTACTS ANALYSIS TO ENSURE THAT
THE PROSECUTION IS FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR
Courts should consider a foreign defendant's minimum con-
tacts with the United States in deciding whether the Due Process
Clause permits asserting jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
accused of violating the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute in theaters
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. A minimum contacts standard is
consistent with how courts functionally apply both the "sufficient
nexus" and the "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" due
process standards. At the same time, this standard reconciles the
164 18 USC § 666(d)(1).
165 249 F3d 1 (1st Cir 2001).
166 Id at 10 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
167 555 F3d 152 (5th Cir 2009).
168 Id at 160 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
169 See, for example, Final Report at 91 (cited in note 1) ("In Iraq and Afghanistan,
bribery and kickbacks are a way of doing business.").
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broad language of the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute with notions
of due process and fundamental fairness.
In World- Wide Volkswagen, the Supreme Court established
that a state "may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent defendant only so long as there exists 'minimum contacts'
between the defendant and the forum State."o70 In judging
whether minimum contacts exist, a court "focuses on the rela-
tionship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation."1 7 1
The contacts between the defendant and the forum state "must
be such that it is 'fair' to compel the defendant to defend a law-
suit in that state. 172 In Keeton v Hustler Magazine,173 the Su-
preme Court found that the 'fairness' of haling a defendant into
court in a forum state "depends to some extent on whether" the
defendant's activities relating to that state "are such as to give
that State a legitimate interest in holding respondent answera-
ble on a claim related to those activities."17 4 A state's specific ju-
risdiction over a defendant "depends on an affiliation between
the forum and the underlying controversy, principally, activity or
an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is there-
fore subject to the State's regulation."75
In many circuits, the criteria for determining whether min-
imum contacts exist are not dissimilar to the factors that courts
consider when determining whether an extraterritorial prosecu-
tion is consistent with due process. In civil cases, many federal
courts employ a three-part test to determine whether minimum
contacts exist to establish specific jurisdiction. 7 6 In the Sixth
Circuit, for example, finding that the exercise of jurisdiction was
proper requires: (1) that the defendant purposely availed himself
of the privilege of acting in the forum state or causing a conse-
quence in the forum state; (2) that the cause of action arises out
of the defendant's contacts with the forum state; and (3) that the
defendant have a "sufficiently substantial connection to the fo-
rum such that the exercise of jurisdiction is not unreasonable." 77
170 444 US at 291.
171 Keeton v Hustler Magazine, 465 US 770, 775 (1984) (quotation marks omitted).
172 Id.
173 465 US 770 (1984).
174 Id at 776.
175 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v Brown, 131 S Ct 2846, 2851 (2011) (quo-
tation marks omitted).
176 See, for example, United States v Swiss American Bank, Ltd, 191 F3d 30, 36 (1st
Cir 1999); Carefirst of Maryland, Inc v Carefirst Pregnancy Centers, Inc, 335 F3d 390, 397
(4th Cir 2003); Schneider v Hardesty, 669 F3d 693, 701 (6th Cir 2012).
177 Schneider, 669 F3d at 701-03.
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Similarly, courts determining whether an extraterritorial prose-
cution comports with due process under both the "sufficient nex-
us" and the "neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair" stand-
ards consider three factors: the nature and extent of a defend-
ant's contacts with the United States; how the alleged conduct
affects the United States, its interests, and its citizens; and
whether the host nation consents to the exercise of jurisdiction
over its citizens.178
Although the last point is exclusive to the exercise of extra-
territorial jurisdiction,17 9 the extraterritorial due process analy-
sis mirrors the minimum contacts test used in domestic civil cas-
es. While the minimum contacts standard would not be a jarring
change, requiring courts to consider this test would allow them
to look to well-developed precedent handed down by the Supreme
Court and administered through individual circuits rather than
compelling district courts to engage in a largely ad hoc inquiry.
Most importantly, using the civil procedure minimum contacts
test for extraterritorial criminal corruption imports the flexible
yet stringent standard necessary to administer a broadly-written
and interpreted law such as the Federal Anti-Bribery Statute in
a manner consistent with due process and international law.
Applying a minimum contacts standard to the facts in
Campbell illustrates how a court might apply this test to deter-
mine whether the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction is prop-
er under the Due Process Clause. Taking the fact pattern from
Campbell, a minimum contacts analysis similar to the test used
by the Sixth Circuit would require the court to first evaluate
whether Campbell purposely availed himself of the United
States. Second, the court would consider whether the cause of
action arose out of Campbell's contacts with the United States.
Third, the court would analyze whether Campbell had a suffi-
ciently substantial connection to the United States so that haling
him into federal court would not be unreasonable. Here, Camp-
178 See Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 F3d at 1257 (discussing how the nexus requirement
serves the same purpose as the minimum contacts test in personal jurisdiction); Moham-
mad-Omar, 323 Fed Appx at 261-62 (finding sufficient contacts where a drug trafficker
knew his heroin would ultimately arrive in the United States, harming United States
interests and United States citizens); Yousef, 327 F3d at 97-98 (noting that asserting
jurisdiction was appropriate because the intended conduct meant to affect United States
foreign policy and kill United States citizens); Davis, 905 F3d at 249 (finding that a nexus
existed because the intended transaction meant to cause criminal acts within the United
States); Cardales, 168 F3d at 553 (discussing consent to jurisdiction).
179 For example, the state of Virginia cannot grant the state of Maryland the authority
to exercise jurisdiction over its citizens.
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bell purposely availed himself of the United States because he
worked as part of a contracting board allocating USAID con-
tracts. This likely satisfies the first prong of the minimum con-
tacts test. Second, Campbell used his position on the contracting
board corruptly by offering to steer $14 million in USAID fund-
ing to a federal agent posing as the representative of an Afghani
subcontracting company in exchange for $190,000 in cash. As
such, Campbell's prosecution under the Federal Anti-Bribery
Statute stems directly from his connection to the United States.
Finally, Campbell openly and knowingly attempted to misallo-
cate federal money for federal gain. Therefore, a court would
likely find that haling him into federal court would be reasonable
and fair because Campbell had a sufficiently substantial connec-
tion to the United States. A minimum contacts analysis would
therefore allow courts to find that the extraterritorial prosecu-
tion of contract fraud under circumstances similar to those in
Campbell satisfies due process.
Adopting a minimum contacts analysis would also guard
against overzealous prosecutions. Although a subcontractor's taxi
driver could technically be found liable under the Federal Anti-
Bribery Statute for accepting gratuities in excess of $5,000 over
the course of a year, a minimum contacts analysis would pre-
clude this type of prosecutorial overreach. The taxi driver scenar-
io would fail under the minimum contacts test for three reasons.
First, the taxi driver never purposely availed himself of the
United States by working with a US-funded entity. Second, the
taxi driver's indictment did not result from his contacts with the
United States; rather, the conduct at issue was directed toward
and contained within a foreign nation. Third, the taxi driver does
not have a sufficiently substantial connection to the United
States to justify the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction under
the Due Process Clause.
These examples show how a minimum contacts standard
would limit extraterritorial prosecutions under § 666 to egre-
gious cases with clear connections to the United States, without
violating Sabri by requiring a nexus between the federal funding
and the bribe solicited or received. By focusing on the conduct,
connections, knowledge, and intent of the offender, the minimum
contacts test ensures that this broad statute will be applied in a
manner consistent with due process and fundamental fairness
while allowing government investigators to use this statute to
combat corruption in overseas government contracts.
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V. CONCLUSION
The United States has lost billions of dollars to fraud, cor-
ruption, and waste in overseas government contracts in theaters
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. To combat corruption in govern-
ment contracts, the United States has begun prosecuting local
and third-country nationals working as contractor employees
under United States criminal laws in a manner that may conflict
with the Due Process Clause. The Federal Anti-Bribery Statute
is one such law. Although the Supreme Court found that the
Federal Anti-Bribery Statute does not require a nexus between
the defendant and the federal funds received, the statute's ex-
pansive language and broad interpretation by the courts creates
the potential for prosecutorial overreach. Courts considering ex-
traterritorial prosecutions brought under the Federal Anti-
Bribery Statute should therefore consider factors similar to the
minimum contacts test for personal jurisdiction established in
World- Wide Volkswagen v Woodson in their analyses of whether
a prosecution is arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.
A
